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ABSTRACT
Inclusionary housing is considered a powerful local policy tool that
can help address housing affordability and social inclusion issues.
This paper draws from empirical research conducted in the City of
Santa Monica in California to provide fresh insights on a successful
innovative inclusionary housing program, the Affordable Housing
Production Program (AHPP). This program was established to
increase affordable housing production and enable social integra-
tion. Based on the Land Use and Circulation Element (LUCE) of the
General Plan, the AHPP seeks to capture some of the increase in
land value resulting from planned increases in the intensity of
development. Our research shows that the program increased inclu-
sionary housing production by market-rate developers by 15% over
the previous inclusionary housing policy. The study finds that land
use policies and planning can, through inclusionary housing, help
harness the strength of the real estate market to (1) increase afford-
able housing production, and (2) achieve effective social integration
in neighborhoods of opportunity.
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1. Introduction
Faced with the reality of the critical importance of housing, many countries continue to
formulate and implement policies aimed at increasing the stock of affordable housing.
However, according to the World Bank (2017), housing remains largely inaccessible and
unaffordable. UN Habitat (2016) argues that the housing policies put in place over the
last 20 years have failed to promote adequate affordable housing. Governments have
backed away from direct supply without giving sufficient consideration to the markets
and to a regulatory framework that would enable other actors in the process to step for-
ward and provide adequate affordable housing. Housing availability and affordability
remains a major pillar in pursuing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as identi-
fied by the United Nations in Habitat III (United Nations, 2016; Trillo, 2019a).
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This paper focuses on Inclusionary Housing (IH) which is one of the tools for pro-
viding affordable housing and is considered effective in helping to build inclusive
communities in many countries worldwide (Jacobus, 2015; Schwartz et al., 2012;
Calavita & Mallach, 2010). Many cities in the USA have experimented with reversing
the trend of housing unaffordability and exclusion by promoting IH (Thaden & Wang
2017). In fact, IH is seen as a solution that may incorporate economic integration when
on-site affordable housing is required, resulting in mixed-income developments (Trillo,
2019b). There are wide variations in the policy design and implementation of IH across
the USA and Thaden & Wang (2017) have provided a taxonomy of these.
According to some scholars IH has promised more than it has delivered (Powell &
Stringham, 2004a, 2004b, 2005; Schuetz et al., 2011; Hollingshead, 2015; Metcalf, 2018);
however, there is still a robust scholarship that supports the contribution of IH in
achieving a higher level of housing affordability and social integration (Sturtevant, 2016;
Basolo & Calavita, 2004; Kautz, 2002; Hickey, 2014). Hickey et al. (2014) add that there
is a need for a better understanding of the characteristics associated with successful pro-
grams, particularly in different legal, economic and political climates, and recommend
that future research is conducted to rigorously evaluate which models work best.
This paper contributes to help fill a gap in the existing scholarship, i.e. the paucity of
studies on the outcomes’ evaluation of extant IH programs at the local scale and, in par-
ticular, the evaluation of the level of social integration achieved. Very few studies offer a
systematic and comprehensive assessment of a particular IH program in terms of its
modifications and associated impacts over a significant timeframe at the local level.
Jacobus (2015) observed that empirical research on the scale, scope, and structure of
inclusionary programs and their impacts is still limited. It is not clear in the literature
how changing a monolithic affordable housing program to include discretionary tier-
based density incentives tied to affordable housing requirements motivates developers.
Additionally, Schwartz et al. (2012) observe that little research has been conducted
to determine whether inclusionary policies are having the intended inclusionary effect
for IH recipients. With respect to these research gaps, this paper offers an original
contribution through an in-depth case study of an IH program, assessing its actual
outcomes over a significant timeframe. The paper focuses on the Affordable Housing
Production Program (AHPP) based on the Land Use and Circulation Element
(LUCE) 2010 in the City of Santa Monica in California to understand its characteris-
tics and context under which it was developed and is being implemented. The study
answers questions regarding why and how the city’s IH program has changed over
time and the effect on program goals of increasing the stock of affordable housing
and enabling social integration. In so doing, the paper makes a significant contribu-
tion to the IH international debate on what works and why in different contexts.
2. Equity planning & housing tools: Inclusionary housing and land
value capture
2.1. Inclusionary housing: an overview
Inclusionary Housing (IH) embraces land use regulations that require developers of
market-rate residential developments to set aside a small portion of their units,
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usually between 10 and 20 percent, for households unable to afford housing in the
market. Alternatively, they can choose to pay a fee or donate land in-lieu of providing
units (Calavita & Mallach, 2009). IH requirements are sometimes in exchange for
development rights or zoning variances (Schwartz et al., 2012). IH programs vary
and, therefore, other narrower or broader definitions of IH can be found in the litera-
ture. For this paper, the researchers use the above definition because this study is
based on a single-case strategy. There is almost complete consensus in the literature
that the main role of IH is to increase housing affordability and increase social and
economic integration (Calavita & Mallach, 2010; Davison et al., 2013; Hickey et al.,
2014; Schwartz et al., 2012; the Urban Institute, 2012; Williams et al., 2016;). In fact,
the reason why these policies are considered “inclusionary” is because they are
intended to allow lower- and moderate-income households to buy or rent property in
middle- and upper-income communities (Schwartz et al., 2012). According to the
Urban Institute (2012), IH is seen as attractive to policymakers because it is cost
effective since the public sector mainly only bears the administrative costs with con-
struction and financing costs being borne mainly by the private sector. However, this
is not always the case, since in some programs, the public sector also bears the cost
of tax abatement and the fee waivers granted to developers (Non-Profit Housing
Association of Northern California, 2007).
2.2. Ih programs in the USA: characteristics and output
2.2.1. Ih program characteristics: an overview
IH programs exhibit varying characteristics in policy and design. They are relatively
complex and tailored to local conditions (Hickey et al., 2014; Thaden & Wang, 2017).
Thaden & Wang (2017) argue that very little is known about IH and its characteris-
tics unlike other affordable housing programs. One consequence is that policymakers,
city staff, and stakeholders are uncertain about adopting the tool. Just as housing
markets across the US vary largely, so do the policies and laws governing IH (Rusk
et al., 2010). The ways in which IH programs are structured and implemented also
vary systematically across states, in response to the amount and type of authority
over land use policies granted to local governments by the states, as well as to the dif-
ferences in the states’ land use programs and initiatives to produce affordable housing
(Schuetz et al., 2009). As the housing market has changed, IH policies and laws have
been enacted, amended and in some cases ended (Rusk et al., 2010). Some existing
programs have been modified, suspended, or repealed (Wiener & Barton, 2014).
IH policies in the USA vary greatly in detail, but share common characteristics
(Wiener & Barton, 2014). Many IH programs permit onsite or offsite affordable
housing production. Wiener & Barton (2014) list alternatives that IH programs offer
to private developers in lieu of building below market-rate homes on the same site as
the market-rate homes. These alternatives include options to: (1) partner with a non-
profit organization that agrees to build the units; (2) build the units offsite or convert
existing units under certain conditions; (3) dedicate land to the local government that
will accommodate a comparable number of units; (4) pay an ‘in lieu’ fee to the local
government to be used for affordable housing; or (5) build more than the required
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units in exchange for reducing the requirement in another development. Most pro-
grams also include incentives that reduce the developer costs of building the below
market-rate units. These incentives include density bonuses; flexible design and devel-
opment standards, such as a reduction in unit square design; parking concessions; fee
waivers, reductions, or deferrals; tax abatements; expedited permit processing; finan-
cial offsets, such as such as direct subsidies; assistance in application for public funds,
such as rent subsidies, bond financing, community development block grants
(Calavita & Mallach, 2010; Jacobus, 2015; Mukhija,Lara & Ashok, 2010; Schuetz et al.,
2009; Wiener & Barton, 2014). As Wiener & Barton (2014: 405) indicate, ‘‘these
incentives not only mitigate costs, but often make the adoption of IH programs more
politically palatable’’. IH ordinances differ in the portion of a development’s units
that are required to be affordable, in the income level of the target population, and in
the length of time the affordability requirements must be met. There are requirements
that affordability remains in place longer for rental units than for ownership units
and jurisdictions frequently increase these durations over time (Schuetz et al., 2009).
Opinions expressed within the academic and professional literature regarding the
IH program characteristics vary. For example, Thaden & Wang (2017) and Calavita
& Mallach (2010) support prioritizing on-site affordable housing development, hence
placing affordable housing in neighborhoods of opportunity. Rusk et al. (2010)
emphasize the importance of not only producing affordable homes, but also of ensur-
ing their long-term affordability. Additionally, Brat (2012) observes that policy mak-
ers have begun to recognize the importance of the affordability restriction period.
Hickey et al. (2014) argue that, even as IH programs have become more prevalent,
there is a lack of information on the successful strategies for facilitating lasting
affordability.
2.2.2. Ih programs in the USA: spread and output
IH has spread across many states in the USA. Thaden & Wang (2017) identified
1,379 IH programs within 791 jurisdictions located in 24 states and in the District of
Columbia, with the vast majority of the jurisdictions being located in New Jersey
(55.11 percent), Massachusetts (26.11 percent), and California (10.44 percent).
However, it is important to note that these numbers are influenced by a state man-
date requiring affordable housing production in each locality in New Jersey and
Massachusetts. In contrast, in California there is no state mandate but instead a num-
ber of cities have adopted either voluntary or involuntary IH in their housing ele-
ments in attempts to boost affordable housing production (Cotter, 2014; Calavita &
Grimes, 1998, 2007). This spread in adoption of IH in the USA and even in other
countries can be described as successful. This success may be understood on many
fronts. Ponce (2010) argues that IH may be understood as a new pragmatic approach
by governments in their efforts to provide affordable housing after many countries
diminished their direct involvement in the provision of affordable housing after neo-
liberalism arose. Ponce argues that, from a governmental perspective, IH can also be
viewed as an outcome that can be achieved by public-private partnerships. Ponce
(2006) observes that, in connection with its goal of achieving social inclusion, IH can
also be understood to be a reaction against past social housing practices and urban
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segregation. According to Calavita (2004), the primary reason behind the spread of
inclusionary housing programs in California was high housing costs.
IH programs have produced a considerable number of affordable housing units in
the market in the USA although statistics on the overall production are inconclusive
and incomplete, with Calavita & Mallach (2010) estimating 129,000 to 160,000 units
with half of that number being produced in California. Thaden & Wang (2017)
reported a total of 173,707 units of affordable housing and $1.7 billion in impact and
in lieu fees produced by some of the 1,379 IH programs identified. However,
although their report is the most recent survey, as Thadon & Wang agree, these num-
bers are substantially underestimated since only a proportion of the programs are
represented and some jurisdictions in the survey did not report their production and
fees for their programs.
2.2.3. Ih programs in the USA: success, effectiveness and impacts on the
housing market
The debate on the success and effectiveness of IH has been alive for a while. Calavita
& Grimes (1998) considers that IH in California and New Jersey has enjoyed a cer-
tain degree of success. Calavita & Mallach (2010) argue that IH, as one of the tools
for addressing affordable housing, promotes social and economic integration when
on-site affordable housing is provided. The Urban Institute (2012) examined IH pro-
grams in Montgomery County, Maryland, and Fairfax County, Virginia and found
that the revision of program requirements, which both counties execute every few
years or so, may be a disincentive for a builder to pursue IH units because of the
ordinance complexity. They also found that incentives, such as density bonuses, were
relatively ineffective in the two cities in motivating developers to produce more
affordable units than the minimum percent required by each ordinance. The Urban
Institute found that developers in Montgomery (which had the highest output of IH
units in the country) had got accustomed to the program’s requirements, viewed it as
part of the cost of doing business and believed that the benefits outweighed the costs.
Although their intended goal is to promote housing affordability and socio-eco-
nomic integration, IH policies have received their fair share of criticism regarding
their potential unintended market consequences. As Jacobus (2015) says, their adop-
tion has almost always been controversial. Hollingshead (2015) argues that to the
extent that IH policies create opportunity costs for developers and function like a tax
on housing supply, they may stifle housing production and increase the price of mar-
ket-rate units, reducing overall affordability. Hollingshead adds that IH may also
increase the supply of affordable housing, which would place downward pressure on
prices. This argument awakens a consistent concern in the literature on who should
bear, or who actually bears, the cost of IH. The argument seems to ignore the poten-
tial of the market to absorb IH costs when developers are compensated through
increased density and other incentives. Jacobus (2015) debunks the suggestion that
developers pass on the costs of IH to tenants and homebuyers by explaining that local
real estate market sets the prices of the market-rate units, and that the developers of
one project cannot change the overall market price or rent. Although Jacobus sug-
gests that the costs associated with construction of IH are either absorbed by modest
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declines in land prices or by reductions in developer profits, or some combination of
the two, we find that there is no empirical analysis to find out if the market can
adequately be harnessed to ensure that no one bears the cost apart from the mar-
ket itself.
The effectiveness of an IH program depends critically on how it is designed and
on the nature of the local housing market (Sturtevant, 2016). Using data on IH in the
San Francisco metropolitan area and suburban Boston, Schuetz et al. (2009) analyzed
how much affordable housing the programs produced and how IH affects the prices
and production of market-rate housing. They found that the amount of affordable
housing produced under IH was modest and depended primarily on how long IH
was in place. They reported that the results from suburban Boston suggested that IH
contributed to increased housing prices and lower rates of production during periods
of regional house price appreciation although the estimated effect was relatively small.
The results suggested that a 1 per cent increase in the time since IH was adopted was
associated with a 0.06 per cent decrease in annual single-family permits, and a 0.014
per cent increase in prices, although weakly statistically significant. In the San
Francisco area, IH also appeared to marginally increase housing prices by 0.013 per-
cent in times of regional price appreciation, but to decrease prices during cooler
regional markets. However, a more recent study by Hollingshead (2015) which exam-
ined the impact of IH using the 2009 Palmer/Sixth Street Properties LP v. City of Los
Angeles ruling did not find any evidence that weakening an inclusionary policy is
associated with a decrease in the rental price of high-cost housing units. The results
also suggested that IH policies, before the Palmer ruling in general, did promote
housing affordability in the low-cost market. The Palmer ruling had weakened IH
particularly for rental housing as the appellate court ruled that California municipal-
ities could not have mandatory IH ordinances for rental housing development, which
was deemed an illegal form of rent control. Further, Schuetz et al. (2009) found no
evidence of a statistically significant effect of IH on new housing development in the
Bay area. Mukhija et al. (2010) also compared data for communities with and without
IH in Southern California and concluded that the adoption of IH policies had no
impact on the overall rate of production. Therefore, if IH does not decrease the sup-
ply of housing, it cannot lead to price increase particularly when it is accompanied
with density bonuses and zoning variances which enable developers to produce
more units.
Knaap et al. (2008) found that IH programs had significant effects on housing
markets in California from 1988 to 2005. Although cities with existing or new pro-
grams during the study period did not experience a significant reduction in the rate
of single-family housing starts, they did experience a marginally significant increase
in multi-family housing starts. More specifically, they found that, in municipalities
with IH programs, the share of multi-family housing starts increased seven (7) per-
cent. The magnitude of this shift varied with the stringency of the inclusionary
requirements. They found that housing prices in cities that adopted IH increased
about 2-3 percent faster than cities that did not adopt such policies. In addition, they
found that housing price effects were greater in higher priced housing markets than
in lower priced markets. These findings suggest that housing producers did not in
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general respond to inclusionary requirements by slowing the rate of single-family
housing construction but did pass the increase in production costs on to housing
consumers. Further, housing producers were better able to pass on the increase in
costs in higher priced housing markets than in lower priced housing markets. Finally,
Knap et al. found that the size of market-rate houses in cities that adopted IH
increased more slowly than in cities without such programs. Their findings suggested
that IH programs caused housing producers to increase the price of more expensive
homes in markets where residents were less sensitive to price, and to decrease the
size of less expensive homes in markets where residents were more sensitive to price.
However, the above study did not specify which IH programs had extended incen-
tives such as density bonuses and seems to ignore the contribution of such incentives
in the housing price mechanism. Powell & Stringham, (2004a, 2004b, 2005) argue
that IH is still a price control that leads to a decrease in the amount of housing.
Powell & Stringham (2004a) found that in cities with IH policies, permits declined 10
to 30 percent in the seven years after the policies were adopted. However, Basolo &
Calavita (2004) criticized these findings and argued that the study could be inter-
preted only as descriptive, not as proof of a causal relationship between inclusionary
housing policies and housing market outcomes as it relied on questionable assump-
tions and had several technical limitations. In fact, what Powel and Stringham seem
to miss in their argument is that where IH requirements are accompanied with
increased density or change of zoning, the net effect will be increased overall hous-
ing production.
There seems to be persistent criticism that IH could theoretically diminish the sup-
ply of housing and therefore increase prices, but there is no agreement about how
often this happens or how significant the impact is (Jacobus, 2015). Based on the
mixed results from scholarship, it is easy to agree with Sturtevant (2016) that IH pol-
icy should be considered as one component of a comprehensive affordable housing
strategy. As Ziebarth (2013: 369) states, “It remains to be seen whether or not inclu-
sive housing can overcome that negative perception and promote sufficient affordable
housing units to meet what seems to be an ever-increasing need as the gap in income
widens between the haves and the have-nots”.
2.2.4. Ih programs in the USA: intervening factors and opportunities
In addition to criticism, IH advocates have had to deal with many intervening factors
that can, and have, influenced IH outcomes, including NIMBY (Not in My Back
Yard) opposition (Calavita & Mallach, 2010; Davison et al., 2013). Some wealthy
communities have mounted extended resistance to allowing any affordable housing in
their borders with years of lawsuits, appeals, and countersuits imposing high costs on
both local governments and developers (Massey et al., 2013). ‘‘Organized neighbor-
hood opposition adds additional, costly delays and can kill projects’’ (Wiener &
Barton, 2014: 408). However, Wiener & Barton argue that simultaneity can preempt
local resistance. When the affordable units are built generally at the same time as the
market-rate units, concurrent development can mitigate opposition from existing
neighbors. After the 2009 Palmer ruling, many jurisdictions in California rolled back
mandatory policies that apply to rental development (Thaden & Wang, 2017). But
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the passage in 2017 of Assembly Bill 1505 (popularly known as “Palmer fix” Bill)
gives counties and cities in California power to implement IH on rental projects
again. “The success of enabling legislation in California adds major momentum to
the fight for IH in the state and beyond” (Murray, 2017).
IH has been shifting towards promoting higher density with increased bonuses,
floor area ratios, and height and there is strong support in the literature for increas-
ing density in our cities. Lynch (1981) argues that no city can physically reach a point
where they cannot (or should not) add population. He observes that a great range of
settlement and urban density patterns across the world, and in USA cities, are not
especially dense. Metcalf (2018) sees limits to growth in a metropolitan area as polit-
ical and aesthetic, not physical. Metcalf says that planning decisions make housing
for most people vastly more expensive than it has to be by restricting the supply of
new units even in the face of growing demand. Furthermore, more and more com-
munities have been consciously seeking to promote mixed-income development
(Jacobus, 2015).
2.3. Inclusionary housing and land value capture
Land Value Capture is a planning mechanism through which increases in land value
resulting from public investments, land-use plan changes and upzonings, are captured
for public benefit. This approach is based on the fact that most of these increases in
value are the result of a public action, not from landowners’ actions. One of the clas-
sical economists, Mill (1848), referred to these increases as the “unearned increment.”
When understood in this light, is only fair and equitable for the public to appropriate
– capture - a reasonable share of the increased land value in the form of community
benefits, including affordable housing. Land Value Capture (LVC) is one tool utilized
in some European and South-American countries (Calavita and Mallach, 2010), and
is now starting to be used in the US as well (Calavita, 2015).
Value increases resulting from land use changes can be captured through IH in
two ways: (1) when a locality mandates IH the cost of development increases and it
is likely that, “in the long run” (Mallach 1984), land values will decrease to reflect the
additional costs for the developer; i.e., developers will negotiate for lower land prices,
or (2) when through upzonings or plan changes possible densities are increased, the
value of land increases as well and, through additional IH requirements, a portion of
that land value increase is captured for public benefit. As we shall see, it is through
this second mechanism that the City of Santa Monica was able to generate more
inclusionary units. With this approach then, IH relies on LVC to capture some of the
increase in land value (through increased affordable housing requirements) brought
by increased density (Nzau & Trillo, 2019). With LVC affordable housing is generated
“through the planning system” (Monk, 2010).
LVC should be distinguished from density bonus approaches in that, at least theor-
etically, with density bonuses the value of the amenities (such as affordable housing
or open space) required from the developer is equivalent to the value of the add-
itional units to be gained from the density increases. Such an exchange, generally vol-
untary, should leave the value of the land unchanged. If the value of the additional
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requirements is higher than the value of the density bonus, the project will be made
infeasible. If the value of the incentives is higher, the value of the land is likely to
increase. Usually, the density bonus is applied to individual projects and not on the
basis of a plan. With LVC the locality will capture some of the “enhanced value”
resulting from any plan changes with the landowner gaining the rest. Such decisions
are based on economic studies, usually referred to as “Residual Land Value Analyses”.
How this scenario “plays in real life will depend on the market and circumstances in
a given locale” (Calavita, 2015: 4). This paper will show how this dynamic unfolded
over a period of seven years in the context of Santa Monica.
3. Research methodology
This study is based on a mixed research approach and a single case study strategy.
The case of LUCE 2010 program was selected on purpose as it met the main criteria
which included: (i) the program being identified as best practice in literature and cor-
roborated through informal interviews with academic experts in the field, and (ii) the
program having been in operation for at least five years to enable an evaluation of
the results. Thus, firstly, the LUCE 2010 program has been considered best practice
in some IH literature (Calavita & Wolfe, 2014; Hickey, 2014) and, secondly, IH has
been implemented in the city for a long time evolving into the present LUCE 2010
based Affordable Housing Production Program (AHPP). This has allowed for the
evaluation of the program and an assessment of the impacts of LUCE on AHPP.
Data collection was carried out over a ten (10) months’ period from April 2018 to
January 2019. Secondary data were gathered from the city offices and websites while
primary data were gathered through interviews, surveys and field observations. The
secondary data collected included program characteristics, the number of both mar-
ket-rate and affordable housing units produced over the years for different programs,
and the levels of affordability of the housing units produced. Primary data were gath-
ered through interviews, complemented by surveys and field observations. The
authors interviewed planners, city officials, developers, academia, community leaders
and affordable housing advocates. Ten (10) persons were purposively selected (includ-
ing 3 local city officials, 2 academicians, 2 developers and 3 community advocates/
leaders), all experienced in the field of IH and affordable housing in the Santa
Monica area. The primary data collected from planners and city officials are related
to issues on program ordinance including motivation, formulation process, the con-
text of adoption and implementation, affordability enforcement, outcomes, and on
the challenges encountered. Developers were interviewed regarding their participation
in program formulation and implementation, their knowledge and views on the
options available to them, and the construction and management of housing units.
Academia, community leaders and affordable housing advocates provided information
regarding community participation, their interests and interactions with the planners
and city officials.
Interviews were complemented by a survey undertaken among IH residents. Their
selection was undertaken through cluster, stratified and simple random sampling
techniques to ensure representation of the population. The clusters were based on the
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location of the households in the city, while the stratification was based on the type
of housing occupied (market-rate or affordable), hence two stratums. A list of
addresses of all IH projects was obtained from the city’s department of housing and
economic development. A grid was prepared covering the whole city and then sam-
ples of IH projects picked in each grid (unless none was available in a grid) through
simple random sampling. A total of 20 buildings were identified. Subsequently, their
property managers were approached and requested to help in serving questionnaires
to the residents. According to the city records, there were 135 buildings with IH in
Santa Monica as at 2017 and the buildings sampled represents 15% of the total IH
building population. In each building, 2-4 questionnaires were administered to the
market-rate households and 1-3 questionnaires to the affordable rate households
depending on the number of units in the building. The total number of question-
naires administered were 85. Of these, 64 or 75% were returned (39 market-rate
occupants and 25 affordable housing occupants). Table 1 shows the demographics of
the sample.
Residents were asked questions regarding their demographic and household char-
acteristics (including gender, age, race, number and age of children), period of resi-
dence, interaction with neighbors, access to social services and public amenities, and
their own views on the level of social and economic integration. Field observations
and a photo survey of the extant IH projects were also undertaken during repeated
fieldwork sessions.
4. Setting the context for the case study
4.1. The santa monica housing market
Santa Monica is a relatively small coastal city to the west of Los Angeles city within
Los Angeles County, California State. Tables 2 and 3 summarize the city’s demo-
graphic characteristics.
There is growing concern that housing in the city is becoming increasingly
unaffordable for the vast majority of its residents (City of Santa Monica, 2013).
Table 1. Demographics of the survey sample.
Gender Male 69%
Female 31%
Race White/Caucasian 34%
Hispanic/Latino 16%
African American 16%
Asian 16%
Mixed 12%
American Indian/Alaska native 6%
Age Below 25 Years 12.5%
25-34 years 37%
35-44 years 16%
45-54 Years 16%
55-64 Years 12.5%
Over 65 Years 6%
Stratum Market rate residents 61%
Affordable units’ residents 39%
Source: authors’ survey from 64 respondents out of a sample of 85, December 2018.
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Demand for affordable housing in the city is high (The Urban Land Institute, 2004)
and developers are increasingly undertaking high-density multi-family developments.
Development has continued to occur by converting lower-intensity land uses to
higher density uses. Multi-family developments of five or more units are increasing
in dominance, growing from 65% to 67% between 2000 and 2010. Single-family
attached and detached homes decreased and stood at 23% in 2010 while smaller two-
to four-unit multi-family complexes represented 10% of the housing stock. Mobile
homes comprised less than 1% of all Santa Monica residences at the time. (City of
Santa Monica, 2013). The median value of owner-occupied housing units in the city
is higher than the state’s and the nation’s average as shown in Table 4.
It is important to explain at this point how affordable housing is understood in
the city. The California state defines affordable housing as housing which is afford-
able to, and occupied by, households of low and moderate-income paying rent not
exceeding 30 percent of the corresponding Area Median Income (AMI) for each
income group adjusted for household size appropriate for the unit. AMIs for all areas
of the country are published annually by the U.S. department of housing and urban
development. For Los Angeles county, the 2017 AMI was $64,300 a year for a family
of four. Moderate-income households’ income is between 81 percent and 120 percent
of AMI and low-income households’ income does not exceed 80 percent of AMI. The
low-income households are further categorized into extremely low-income, very low-
income and low-income. The extremely low-income households’ income does not
Table 2. Population & race distribution, Santa Monica citywide.
Area
(Sq. Miles)
Population
(1st July 2017)
Population
Density
(1st July 2017)
People
Per Sq. Mile
Race
Distribution
White
Black/ African
American Asian
Mixed
Race
American
Indians &
Alaska Native
Native
Hawaiian
& Other
Pacific
Islanders
Hispanic or
Latino Origin
(Of any Race)
8.42 92,306 10,962 78% 4.1% 10% 4.9% 0.5% 0.1% 16.1%
Source: Author’s Compilation (Data from US Census Bureau, accessed December 2018).
Table 3. Age and Gender Distribution, Santa Monica citywide.
Age and Gender Distribution Population living
below the federal poverty lineUnder 18 25 to 44 65 or more Men Female
14% 36% 16.2% 51.7% 48.3% 11%
Source: Author’s Compilation (Data from US Census Bureau & worldpopulationreview.com, accessed December 2018).
Table 4. Median value, median gross rent & home ownership in Santa Monica (2013-2017).
MARKET CHARACTERISTICS IN SANTA MONICA (2013-2017)
Median Value (Owner Occupied Houses) The Median Gross Rent Home Ownership
Santa Monica California US Santa Monica California US Santa Monica California US
$1,168,500 $443,400 $193,500 $1,669 $1,358 $982 27.7% 54.5% 63.8%
Source: Author’s Compilation (Data from U.S. Census Bureau, accessed December 2018).
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exceed 30 percent of AMI, very low-income households’ income is between 31 and
50 percent of AMI and low-income households’ income is between 51 and 80 percent
of AMI.
4.2. Inclusionary housing as a tool for affordable housing provision in the city
of santa monica
The City of Santa Monica has implemented various IH programs since the late 1980s.
The genesis of IH in the city can be traced to 6th November 1990 when the voters
passed proposition R, which required that 30 percent of all new multi-family
residential housing units produced in the city annually be affordable to low and mod-
erate-income people with at least fifty percent of the affordable units being for the
low-income households.
Since 1990 there have been various implementing ordinances passed by the coun-
cil. The current Affordable Housing Production Program (AHPP) was implemented
in July 1998. According to the city’s municipal code, AHPP (which implements prop-
osition R) allows developers of new multi-family housing to satisfy their affordable
housing obligation through a variety of options as listed below:
1. Including affordable units in the market-rate project,
2. Developing affordable units at another location in the city,
3. Paying a fee in-lieu of developing affordable units,
4. Dedicating land to the city or to a non-profit housing development entity.
The housing requirements under each option are summarized in Table 5.
5. Innovation in affordable housing policies and planning: AHPP under
the land use and Circulation element (LUCE) 2010
On 6th July 2010, the City of Santa Monica adopted a new Land Use and Circulation
Element (“LUCE”) of the General Plan (City of Santa Monica, 2010). Among other
objectives, LUCE was designed to encourage additional housing in a sustainable man-
ner where few or none existed. The plan accomplishes this by establishing a max-
imum ministerial base building height of 32 feet and requiring that projects over the
base height incorporate community benefits, with affordable housing identified as a
primary community benefit. The program, therefore, allows more Floor Area Ratio
(FAR), height and density but captures the resultant gains in land values by requiring
additional affordable housing in the development. This is undertaken through three
approval tiers or procedural paths which were established to regulate development.
The tiers are tied to the type of development, its location and intensity. The program
provides for prerequisite ministerial (by-right) approval of projects that meet all the
applicable requirements and do not exceed the base height and two optional tiers,
both of which would require applicants to provide community benefits (including
affordable housing) in order to receive approval to increase the project’s height and/
or floor area.
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Table 6 compares the Affordable Housing Production Program (AHPP) Pre-LUCE
2010 and the AHPP Post-LUCE 2010
The LUCE 2010 program required economic analyses during the planning phase
to determine ‘enhanced land values’ resulting from higher densities. These analyses
indicated that projects would be financially feasible even after providing community
benefits. Such analyses are also required for individual projects seeking tier 2 or tier 3
height bonuses and provide context for the city’s decision-making over what level of
community benefits is to be required (Hickey et al., 2014).
LUCE 2010 established three tiers which are summarized in Table 7: Tier 1 is the
basic option, which establishes the base height and FAR, with no additional commu-
nity benefits required. However, under Tier 1, developers are rewarded with add-
itional floor if they provide affordable housing on-site or close to transit corridors (if
they choose the off-site option). Under Tier 1, all apartment projects can pay fees in-
lieu of including affordable units but for condominium projects, only those of 3 units
or less, or projects located in commercial zones, can pay fees in-lieu of including
affordable units. For developers who choose to provide affordable units offsite, the
location where they develop them should be within a quarter (1=4) mile of the mar-
ket-rate project. An exception to this rule may be granted if the developer provides
substantial evidence that the location of the off-site units in a location different from
that required better accomplishes the goals of affordable inclusionary housing, that is,
Table 5. Affordable housing production programme options in Santa Monica.
OPTION
Ownership projects in multi-family residential zones Rental projects (2 or
more units) in both
multi-family
residential zones
and non-residential
(commercial /
industrial) zones2-3 units 4 -15 units 16 or more units
ON-SITE  5% extremely
low-income units
(for rental)
or
 10% very low-
income units
(for rental),
or
 20% low income
units (for rental),
or
 100% moderate
income units
(for rental)
 5% extremely
low-income units
(for rental)
or
 10% very low-
income units
(for rental)
or
 20% low-income
units (for rental)
or
 20% moderate-
income units (as
ownership units)
 10% extremely
low-income units
(for rental)
or
 15% very low-
income units
(for rental)
or
 25% low-income
units (for rental)
or
 25% moderate-
income units (as
ownership units)
 5% extremely
low-income units
(for rental)
or
 10% very low-
income units
(for rental),
or
 20% low income
units (for rental),
or
 100% moderate
income units
(for rental)
OFF-SITE Same as on-
site option
25% more than
required number
of on-site units
25% more than
required number
of on-site units
Same as on-
site option
IN-LIEU FEES (2018) $35.70/sf for
apartments
$41.70/sf for
condominiums
Not Applicable Not Applicable $35.70/sf for
apartments
$41.70/sf for
condominiums
LAND DONATION Within 1=4 Mile Not Applicable Not Applicable Within 1=4 Mile
Source: Author’s Compilation from Santa Monica Municipal Code, accessed May 2018.
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maximizing affordable housing production and dispersing affordable housing
throughout the city.
Tier 2 allows additional height and FAR through a ministerial approval process.
Tier 2 housing projects must provide 50% more affordable units than Tier 1 either
onsite or offsite. They cannot pay fees in-lieu of providing affordable units. Tier 3
allows more height and FAR than Tier 2 but requires development agreements to be
signed between the city and the developers with a public review. Tier 3 differs sub-
stantially from both Tier 1 and Tier 2 mechanisms of implementation because it rests
on negotiation whereas Tier 1 and Tier 2 are plan based. Tier 3 is applied only on
large projects while Tier 1 and Tier 2 cover small to medium projects. So far, Tier 3
has been applied on a limited number of cases, while Tier 2 represents the most com-
mon way of implementing the LUCE plan (Interviews with city officials of the City
of Santa Monica, December 2018).
Table 7 summarizes the LUCE 2010 program and shows how, by progressing from
Tier 1 to Tier 3, the public benefits in terms of a higher percentage of affordable
housing required to be provided as the developers get more height and FAR.
6. Towards an evaluation of LUCE 2010
We began by seeking to understand what has been pushing the city to seek for
innovative ways of financing affordable housing. Interviews with city officials and
documents availed revealed several compelling factors. Firstly, the reduced federal
support of public housing since the 1970s has resulted in a housing shortage mani-
fested in low vacancy rates and rising rents. Secondly, the dissolution of the
Redevelopment Agency (RDA) in 2012 affected the city’s affordable housing produc-
tion as RDA was the single largest funding source for affordable housing and was
instrumental in increasing affordable housing production in the past (Blount et al.,
2014). Thirdly, the city has been responding to the serious need for affordable hous-
ing as reflected in local, state and federal housing regulations and policies (Ordinance
Table 6. Pre-LUCE & Post-LUCE 2010, Santa Monica.
AHPP Pre-LUCE 2010 AHPP Post-LUCE 2010
Time Period 1998-2010 2010-Present
Requirements Mandatory Mandatory under Tier 1
Voluntary under Tiers 2 and 3
Applied mostly in residential districts.
Residential developments in commercial
and industrial zones allowed only after
getting a development review permit or
administrative approval
Residential developments in residential,
commercial and industrial zones through
Ministerial approval
Program attributes No comprehensive approach to mixed use
development
Comprehensive approach to mixed use
development
Tedious approval process Faster approval
Easier for developers
Ministerial Plan approval up to 75,000 sq.
meters in the Downtown Community Plan
Low affordable housing High & predictable affordable housing at
50% under tier 2
Bonuses State bonus program Bonus exceeding the State bonus program
tied to 3 tiers
Source: Authors’ elaboration on City of Santa Monica data, December 2018.
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No. 2486CCS adopted on 23/06/2015). Fourthly, the city aims to maintain an inclu-
sive diverse community (City Council Special Meeting Minutes of 23/8/2015 - City of
Santa Monica, 2015). Fifthly, the latest policy (LUCE 2010) was Santa Monica’s
innovative way of responding to the Palmer ruling, which prevented a mandatory IH
rental policy. A developer can choose to provide rental housing under Tier 2 in
exchange for more height and FAR, while under Tier 3 rental inclusionary units can
be part of a development agreement. This arrangement makes the requirement for
rental housing provision legal, since it is voluntary and enables capture of land value
for community benefits possible.
It is extremely important at this point to stress that the Santa Monica program is
in addition to, and on top of, existing IH requirements. It is very similar to a density
bonus program, but different in that it is based on a land use plan, on economic
analyses that ascertain the land value increases due to the density bonus (for land
Table 7. Tiers under Santa Monica’s LUCE 2010.
TIER 1 TIER 2 TIER 3
Height Establishes the base
height and FAR
Above base height
and FAR
Above tier 2
Community Benefits No additional community
benefits save for the
existing ones under
AHPP pre-LUCE 2010
50% more affordable
housing than Tier 1
must be provided
Higher numbers of
affordable housing
units through
development
agreements
Approval Process Ministerial (by-right) Ministerial (by-right) Includes public review
Additional Development 3 to 7 extra feet (1 extra
floor) allowed if
affordable housing is
provided on-site or
close to transit corridors
Additional height and
FAR provided
More height and FAR than
tier 2
In-lieu fees All Apartment projects can
pay in-lieu fees. For
Condominium projects,
only those of 3 units or
less, or projects located
in commercial zones,
can pay in- lieu fees
Payment of in-lieu fees
not allowed
Payment of in-lieu
fees allowed
Affordable Housing
Requirements
Same as in the AHPP pre-
LUCE 2010
5% extremely low-income,
or 15% very low-
income, or 30% low-
income.
No Moderate-income
units allowed.
By negotiation
Size & Number of
Affordable
Units’ Bedrooms
Same as in the AHPP pre-
LUCE 2010
Bedroom number same or
greater than the
number of market-rate
bedrooms.
Size must be the same
as the market-rate
units.
Must have at least 15%
3-bedroom units, at
least 15% 2-bedroom
units and not more
than 15% studios. The
average number of
bedrooms must be 1.2
By negotiation
Scale Small to Medium Small to Medium Large
Source: Authors’ elaboration on City of Santa Monica data, December 2018.
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value capture), and on extensive public participation. To evaluate AHPP under LUCE
2010, we sought to understand how the program works and how the city ensures
compliance with AHPP requirements by developers. To begin with, as developers get
project approvals, they have to sign an agreement with the city which imposes restric-
tions on their properties. To remove any possible bias and enhance equity, the city
requires developers to accept prospective tenants only from the city’s consolidated list
of appropriately qualified applicants. Developers are required to submit annual online
reports on tenants and their household incomes. Household incomes are allowed to
increase to 140% of income limit before tenants are required to move out to allow
other deserving households to benefit.
It was found that developers have embraced LUCE 2010 positively as it has
brought provisions to the AHPP which enhanced their project’s feasibility compared
to the provisions existing before. For instance, the provision giving 25% to 50% dis-
counts on in-lieu fees if offsite development occurs on land in non-residential zones
was expensive to exploit before 2010 due to a lengthy costly approval process. This
provision which aimed at reducing pressure on residential land and dispersing resi-
dential development to commercial and industrial zones was almost redundant and
unutilized before 2010. However, LUCE 2010 brought a comprehensive mixed-use
policy assuring quick approvals and developers have utilized the provision resulting
in developments spreading into these unutilized zones.
The majority of the projects particularly before LUCE 2010 chose to pay in-lieu fees.
Between 2003/2004 and 2009/2010, 70 out of 82 projects (85%) by for-profit developers
paid in-lieu fees. Under the LUCE 2010 program, payment of in-lieu fees is not allowed
under tier 2 and this together with increased offsite affordable housing construction
explains why out of 55 projects by for-profit developers, only 30 of them (55%) paid the
fees. Figure 1 illustrates the marked decrease in projects paying the in-lieu fees in post-
LUCE 2010 as compared to pre-LUCE 2010. Figure 1 also shows that the number of off-
site constructions of affordable units increased after 2010.
We questioned why, in post-LUCE 2010, still 55% of the projects were taking the
option of paying in-lieu fees instead of incorporating more IH on-site, since this high
percentage goes against the LUCE 2010 goal of ensuring mixed income neighbor-
hoods. Evidence from the interviews and the quantitative data gathered from the City
of Santa Monica planning office clarified that the projects which paid in-lieu fees in
the post-LUCE 2010 period were mostly small projects. It is obviously challenging for
a small project to identify a suitable percentage of affordable units on-site, and it is
expected that small developments would tend to pay the in-lieu fee. Well distributed
affordable housing is easier to achieve in large developments, where more flexibility
in the allocation of the units is possible. As shown in Figure 2, in the post-LUCE
2010 period, the majority of the projects that paid in-lieu fees were very small proj-
ects. 83% of the projects had a total of 1 to 5 units, 10% had 6 to 10 units, 3.5% had
16 to 20 units and only 1% had 26 to 30 units. In comparison, in the period 2003-
2010 (pre-LUCE), larger projects paid in-lieu fees with 70% having 1-5 units, 18%
with 6 to 10 units, 2.5% with 11 to 15 units, 4% with 16 to 20 units, 1.5% with 21 to
25 units, 2.5% with 51-100 units and 1.5% with 101 to 150 units. The fact that, in the
post-LUCE 2010 period, there were no projects with more than 30 units that paid
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in-lieu fees, when previously projects with over 100 units took that option, is
a manifestation of success in ensuring mixed income developments and ensuring
social integration. This finding brings impetus to the intense debate going on within
the affordable housing advocates’ community relating to whether IH developers
should be allowed to pay in-lieu fees, or be required to build the affordable units
within the project they are proposing. In debating this, we need to remind ourselves
Figure 2. Size of projects paying in-lieu fees in Santa Monica (2003 – 2017). Source: Authors’ elab-
oration on City of Santa Monica data, December 2018.
Figure 1. Number of Projects in Santa Monica (2003- 2017). Source: Authors’ elaboration on City
of Santa Monica data, December 2018.
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that IH is not only about producing affordable housing, but also about enabling social
and economic integration. With an increase in projects choosing on-site affordable hous-
ing provision in Santa Monica after LUCE 2010 we argue that: (1) the low-income
households are likely to benefit from living close to higher-income people because social
and economic opportunities for low-income families are enhanced by living in the same
building as their wealthier next door neighbors, and (2) more affordable units would be
built since the in-lieu fee does not usually cover the full cost of building affordable units.
Additionally, construction of IH housing units is especially important for Santa Monica
because every market-rate project built without affordable units makes it more difficult to
build affordable housing projects, because it decreases an already short supply of develop-
able land. And in a region where many neighborhoods are gentrifying, inclusionary units
would ensure a minimum of social integration.
Interviews with city decision and policy makers indicated that there is a feeling
that the in-lieu fees are too low and not commensurate with the loss of affordable
units. Information from the housing department indicated that producing an afford-
able low-income unit costs approximately $500,000. However, looking at Table 8, the
fees paid falls far below that cost and is also inconsistent with the number of units
lost. In the table, we calculated the number of units which projects paying in-lieu fees
could have built if they had provided on-site affordable units based on the AHPP
requirement of 30% for low-income housing category. The last column showing the
average fee per unit illustrates the inconsistency (fluctuations up and down over the
years) in the amount of fees compared to the units lost.
It is important to note that, in most cases, in-lieu fees are leveraged to access
external funding, such as Federal Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, allocated by the
State. When this happens, it results in at least double the number of units con-
structed. But, as the data in Table 8 above show, it will require in-lieu fees to be
leveraged at least five times to achieve an affordable unit (going by 2016/2017 average
fee paid per unit) which is not easy to achieve (interviews with city officials, 2018).
Quantitative results from the LUCE 2010 program show that between the 2010/
2011 fiscal year and the 2016/2017 fiscal year, cumulatively 1663 housing units were
produced in the city. Of these, 974 units were market-rate units and 689 were afford-
able units. Therefore, 41% of the housing units produced in the city during this
period were affordable. It was found that private developers preferred incorporating
very-low income units because the requirements allow them to provide less of these
Table 8. In-Lieu fees paid in Santa Monica (2010–2017).
Period
Number of
projects which
paid in-lieu fees
Number of market
rate units for
projects which paid
in-lieu fees
Approximate
affordable low-income
units if on-site units
were provided @30%
Fees
paid (US$)
Average fee paid
per unit (US$)
2010/2011 2 12 4 239,510 66,530.56
2011/2012 4 21 6 717,184 113,838.73
2012/2013 5 48 14 442,246 30,711.53
2013/2014 3 9 3 451,199 167,110.74
2014/2015 9 32 10 1,093,252 113,880.42
2015/2016 3 8 2 481,232 200,513.33
2016/2017 4 29 9 1,247,872 143,433.56
Source: Authors’ elaboration on City of Santa Monica data, December 2018.
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units thus allowing them to get more market-rate units. Figure 3 presents the afford-
ability levels of the 689 affordable units and shows that there were more affordable
units provided in the very low-income category.
We analyzed the contribution of the market through the inclusionary policy and
found that, out of the 689 affordable units, 259 were produced from the market
whereas 430 were city-funded produced by non-profit developers (Figure 4). This
means that within the seven years the program has been in place, 38% of all newly
produced affordable units in the city were financed by the market, built by market-
rate developers through the inclusionary policy with no cost to the city save for
administration expenses.
It is important to note that the above numbers do not include affordable units pre-
served using federal funds. It is also worth noting that the market contribution under
the LUCE 2010 program is even greater than the 38% because the in-lieu fees paid by
private developers partly constitute the city funds loaned to not-for profit developers.
According to city officials, in-lieu fees constitute about 10% of the total city funds for
affordable housing. As noted earlier, when these funds are leveraged, they bring at
least double funds hence approximately 20% of the city funded affordable housing
units are attributable to in-lieu fees. However, data on the exact number of affordable
housing units resulting from in-lieu fees or the exact amount leveraged from the fees
was not available since the City of Santa Monica did not closely monitor such data.
Therefore, the officials we have interviewed could only give approximations and not
actual figures. This is a weakness which we also found in other three cities with IH
programs in California which we covered under our larger research project. There is,
therefore, a need for stricter data monitoring and further research could be conducted
after a reasonable timeframe to assess what in-lieu fees actually achieve in terms of
affordable housing production; but our analysis offers a certain amount of evidence
that, in the case of Santa Monica, prohibiting payment of in-lieu fees generated more
affordable housing from market- rate developers after LUCE 2010. What is clear is
that in-lieu fees as part of city funds are used to produce off-site affordable housing
units and may not help to disperse affordable housing units and increase social
Figure 3. Affordable housing in Santa Monica (2010- 2017). Source: Authors’ elaboration on City of
Santa Monica data, December 2018.
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integration across different income groups as on-site affordable housing units do.
This is well demonstrated ahead in Figure 7 and the related discussion.
In order to understand the impact of LUCE 2010 on affordable housing production,
we analyzed data on the affordable units financed from the market using the inclusion-
ary policy in a temporal perspective. Firstly, we focused on the program itself and com-
pared data for fourteen fiscal years, seven years before and seven years after the LUCE
2010 implementation. Between 2003/2004 and 2009/2010, market rate developers pro-
duced 223 affordable units and 1106 market-rate units. Between 2010/2011 and 2016/
2017, the production by market developers of affordable units increased to 259 and that
of market-rate units decreased to 974 (Figure 5). This is a 15% increase in affordable
units and a 12% decrease in market-rate units. Comparing the proportion of affordable
units to total units produced by market-rate developers, we found that whereas 17% of
all units produced by market-rate developers between 2003/2004 and 2009/2010 were
affordable, this increased to 21% between 2010/2011 and 2016/2017.
From the literature and interviews with developers and affordable housing experts,
we identified other factors that might impact upon affordable housing production
and controlled them in order to isolate the impact of the LUCE 2010, relative to these
other factors. The factors identified are: (i) housing demand; (ii) the cost of credit
finance; (iii) housing prices/rents; (iv) land prices, and (v) the cost of construction
(materials and labor). Measurements were undertaken for all the individual factors
over a 14 years’ period (the seven pre-LUCE years and the seven post-LUCE years).
Table 9 summarizes how the factors were measured and lists the data sources.
The hypothesis to be tested were formulated as follows: (1) Null hypothesis: There
is no correlation between LUCE 2010 and affordable housing production; (2)
Alternative hypothesis: There is a positive correlation between LUCE 2010 and
affordable housing production.
Figure 4. Affordable housing units produced in Santa Monica (2010-2017). Source: Authors’ elabor-
ation on City of Santa Monica data, December 2018.
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Using SPSS Statistics, a partial correlation was run to determine the relationship
between affordable housing production and the LUCE 2010 policy while controlling
for the six other factors identified above. The descriptive statistics (Table 10) show
that we had no missing data since the recorded sample N¼ 14 is the same as the
number of years data was entered. N shows the number of observations and for our
case we have 14 observations, each observation representing annual affordable hous-
ing production for one year. We can also see that the mean for affordable housing
for the 14 years is 34.4286 with a standard deviation of 27.11433. The correlation
results are presented in Table 11.
Figure 5. Market rate & Affordable units’ production in Santa Monica 2003-2017. Source: Authors’
elaboration on City of Santa Monica data, December 2018.
Table 9. Key factors hypothesized to affect affordable housing production in Santa Monica
between 2003 and 2017.
Factor Measurement Source
Housing demand Average annual rental vacancy U.S. Census Bureau’s American
Community Survey
Cost of credit finance US 15-year Fixed Rate Mortgage
(FRM) rate
Freddie Mac’s Primary Mortgage
Market Survey
Housing prices / rents Rate of annual increase in median rents U.S. Census Bureau’s American
Community Survey
Land prices Rate of annual change in land prices Federal Housing Finance Agency &
City of Santa Monica
Cost of construction (Materials
and labour)
Construction prices indexes U.S. Census Bureau
LUCE 2010 Ordinal measurement (1 for Post-LUCE
and 0 for pre-LUCE 2010)
City of Santa Monica
Source: Author’s Construction based on literature review and interviews with experts; Data from City of Santa
Monica;U.S. Census Bureau, accessed December 2018; Federal Housing Finance Agency, 2019; Freddie Mac’s Primary
Mortgage Market Survey, n.d)
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The above table shows two results – the one at the bottom highlighted by a blue
rectangle shows correlation between LUCE 2010 and affordable housing production
while controlling for all other variables identified. The results at the top (called zero-
order correlations) highlighted by the green rectangle shows correlation between
affordable housing production and LUCE 2010 without controlling for the other vari-
ables identified. The coefficient of correlation (r) shows the strength and direction of
correlation and its value ranges from -1 to þ1. Correlations above 0.4 are considered
to be relatively strong; correlations between 0.2 and 0.4 are moderate, and those
below 0.2 are considered weak. The p-value helps in determining the significance of
the correlation results and is a number between 0 and 1. A small p-value (typically 
0.05) indicates strong evidence against the null hypothesis and the null hypothesis is
rejected and vice versa.
The above results show a positive moderate partial correlation between affordable
housing production and LUCE 2010 while controlling for housing demand, the cost
of credit finance, housing prices/rents, land prices and the cost of construction (high-
lighted by the blue rectangle). This correlation was statistically significant, (r(7) ¼
0.397, N¼ 14, p¼ 0.029). With a p-value of 0.029 (less than 0.05), it means the cor-
relation is significant. The zero-order correlations between affordable housing pro-
duction and LUCE 2010 without controlling for housing demand, the cost of credit
finance, housing prices/rents, land prices and the cost of construction (highlighted by
the green rectangle) showed that there was also a statistically significant, positive cor-
relation between affordable housing production and the LUCE 2010 policy (r(12) ¼
0.298, n¼ 14, p¼ 0.007), indicating that the other five variables had very little influ-
ence in controlling the relationship between affordable housing production and the
LUCE 2010 policy. This is because even when they are not controlled, they do not
render the correlation between LUCE 2010 and affordable housing production insig-
nificant. With these results, we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative
hypothesis that there is a positive correlation between LUCE 2010 and affordable
housing production.
In order to evaluate the ability of LUCE 2010 to harness the market and increase
the proportion of affordable housing in relation to the total housing produced in the
city, we compared the housing outputs from the LUCE program with outputs in two
other southern Californian cities (Los Angeles and San Diego). We selected these two
cities because they are the biggest south Californian cities with growing real estate
markets and they run IH programs. Unfortunately, we could only get Los Angeles
Table 10. Results of the descriptive statistics for the key factors hypothesized to affect affordable
housing production in Santa Monica between 2003 and 2017. Source: Author’s data analysis.
Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. Deviation N
Affordable_Housing 34.4286 27.11433 14
LUCE .5000 .51887 14
Rental_vacancy_rate 2.5500 .56806 14
Rate_median_rent 3.1143 1.03764 14
Cost_Credit 4.2950 1.12012 14
Rate_land_price 10.4393 4.26858 14
Cost_of_Construction 4.0571 2.92935 14
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and San Diego’s housing output data for the period 2009 to 2017 and, therefore, our
comparative analysis covers this period. We wanted to ascertain if the increase in
proportion of affordable housing in relation to the total housing produced was hap-
pening in the two big cities. In doing this, we compared the trends in total housing,
market-rate housing and affordable housing production in Santa Monica and the two
cities. The comparative results in Figure 6 show that the trend in affordable housing
production in Santa Monica is different from the other two cities as it increases and
decreases with both market-rate and total housing productions. In the other two cit-
ies, annual affordable housing production does not follow the pattern of both mar-
ket-rate and total housing production and is actually almost flat over the years.
These results demonstrate that Santa Monica city is harnessing the market for
Figure 6. Trends in total, market-rate and affordable housing productions in Santa Monica 2011-
2017, benchmarked against San Diego, San Francisco and Los Angeles. Source: Authors’ elaboration
on City of Santa Monica, San Diego, San Francisco and Los Angeles data, December 2018.
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affordable housing production more efficiently than Los Angeles and San
Diego cities.
To find out if AHPP has helped to disperse affordable housing across the city,
using geo-coded property data for the whole city, we mapped the locations of the
for-profit market developments with affordable units and the city funded housing
projects (Figure 7). It can be seen that AHPP through the market developments has
dispersed affordable housing across the city better than the city funded program. Of
critical importance is the finding that AHPP has enabled low income households to
access costly neighborhoods of opportunity including the downtown in a way they
could not have if the city relied on its funded projects alone. Figure 7 shows the
land use map of Santa Monica City overlaid with location of affordable housing
units, produced through both the IH policy (red dots) and the city funds (blue
dots). The figure shows a high number of IH units in the downtown area - 12 mar-
ket-rate buildings were built within the city downtown area (orange color on the
map). Only 3 city funded buildings were built in the downtown. Moreover, the 12
IH buildings are well dispersed in the whole downtown area, unlike the 3 city
funded buildings which are clustered in a small area of the downtown. Similar sit-
uations emerge in the high cost low-density neighborhoods of the city. These areas
have better services including quality schools, better walk scores and better access
to parks.
We asked city officials if there could be any requirements by the city council
placed on the non-profit developers who are funded by the city which could have
influenced the location of their projects. It was confirmed that these developers were
Figure 7. Location of Affordable units in Santa Monica. Source: Mapping by authors based on
Santa Monica data, December 2018.
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not subject to any legal or regulatory constraints that could have driven the choice of
location of their projects. The location of these projects is mostly determined by land
prices hence mostly being located in relatively cheaper and less affluent neighbor-
hoods than market-rate projects.
We sought to find out the quality of services enjoyed by the affordable unit occu-
pants in their neighborhoods. In the survey questionnaires that we administered to
them, we asked them to score the quality of various services they enjoy within their
neighborhoods on a scale of 1 – 5. The results are shown in Table 12.
The above results show that affordable housing residents rated highly the services
in the neighborhoods in which they resided. ‘‘Access to quality schools’’ was best
rated with a mean score of 4.84 out of 5 followed by ‘‘access to better walkways’’ and
‘‘access to public parks’’ with mean score of 4.80 and 4.19 out of 5 respectively. This
means that the residents are satisfied with the level of services in their
neighborhoods.
As mentioned earlier, the sample was stratified to reflect the different experiences
of the two groups of residents, those occupying market-rate housing and those occu-
pying affordable housing. To find out if social integration had been achieved in the
IH developments and the neighborhoods, questionnaires with closed and open-ended
questions were served on both stratums of the sample. Residents were asked whether
they felt their neighborhoods were socially well integrated and the reason(s) for their
answer. The survey results show that the majority of the residents feel that the neigh-
borhoods with IH are socially well integrated. However, there was some disparity in
approval of integration among the two groups with higher approval coming from the
market-rate residents. As shown in Figure 8, 95% of market-rate units’ residents and
80% of affordable units’ residents felt that their neighborhoods are well integrated,
with 20% of affordable units’ residents indicating that the neighborhoods are not well
integrated compared to 5% of market-rate residents who indicated the same. These
results suggest that the expectations of affordable units’ residents in terms of what
constitutes a well-integrated neighborhood is higher than those of the market-
rate residents.
Residents who thought their neighborhoods were well integrated mainly gave two
reasons. These are: the presence of different economic groups and the presence of dif-
ferent racial groups within the neighborhoods. Those who thought the neighborhoods
Table 12. Scoring of access to services by respondents in Santa Monica, December 2018.
Service Score No. of respondents Mean score Standard deviation
Access to Quality Schools 4 10 4.84 0.3631
5 54
Access to better walkways 3 4 4.80 0.5356
4 5
5 55
Access to Public parks 4 52 4.19 0.3903
5 12
Access to Employment 2 15 3.86 1.2483
3 10
4 8
5 31
Source: Survey by authors.
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are not well integrated observed that there are too few affordable units compared to
the number of needy people.
Figure 9 shows the distribution by race of residents who indicated that neighbor-
hoods are well integrated.
Asked if they were aware if there are affordable units in their neighborhood, 90%
of market-rate occupants replied in the affirmative. But asked if they were aware if
there are affordable units within their buildings, only 40% of market-rate occupants
replied in the affirmative. 60% of market-rate occupants were not aware of the pres-
ence of affordable units within their buildings. We asked those who were aware that
there are affordable units within their buildings if they knew the units which are
affordable. Only 10% (of the 40% of market-rate occupants) said they knew at least
one affordable unit within the building and also knew their occupants and somehow
Figure 8. Respondents response to level of integration in their neighborhoods in Santa Monica.
Source: Survey by authors (December 2018)
Figure 9. Distribution by race of respondents who indicated that neighborhoods are well inte-
grated in Santa Monica. Source: Survey by authors (December 2018).
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interacted with them. They, therefore, knew of such affordable units from the inter-
action with their occupants and not from the physical appearance of the units.
From the responses on the open-ended questions, three main drivers for inter-
action among residents were identified. It was observed that residents, who had inter-
acted, had met either (i) in the common rooms/spaces, (ii) through their children, or
(iii) when walking their dogs. The results show that those residents residing in build-
ings with common rooms and those having children and dogs were more likely to
interact with others of different socio-economic groups. As shown in Table 13, 50%
of both the market-rate and affordable rate residents who interacted with neighbors
indicated they did so when using the common rooms within their buildings. 50% of
the market-rate and 30% of the affordable rate residents who interacted with neigh-
bors indicated they met their neighbors through their children. Their children often
visited or played with their neighbors’ children in the same building and the parents
ended up meeting in the process. 20% of affordable units’ residents who had inter-
acted with market-rate units’ residents indicated that they had met their neighbors
while walking their dogs into or out of their buildings at the same time.
The level of interaction was also found to differ with the demographic characteris-
tics of the respondents and the length of stay in their current residences (Figure 10).
The survey found that residents who have stayed for a long time and who are older
are more likely to interact with others. For those who had interacted with others,
70% of them had stayed in their present residences for more than two years. In terms
of age, 10% were below 25 years, 20% were between 25 and 34 years, 20% were
between 35 and 44 years and 50% were above 45 years.
In terms of race, those who interacted were 30% white/Caucasian, 20% Hispanic/
Latino, 20% African American, 10% Asian and 20% mixed race. This is shown in
Figure 11:
Residents living in affordable units were asked further closed questions including
where they had resided before, whether they thought that moving into the neighbor-
hood had improved their socio- economic status, and whether they had noticed any
negative bias associated with their status of residence in an affordable/below market
unit. Affordable units’ occupants surveyed indicated they had resided either in low
income (50%) or mixed income (50%) neighborhoods before getting their present
affordable units. They all indicated that they were happy with their present neighbor-
hoods. 80% of them considered that moving into their present neighborhoods and
occupying their present housing units had improved their socio-economic status
because of the benefits they enjoy including easy access to work, schools, transport
and public facilities. The majority of them (90%) indicated that they had never expe-
rienced any bias within their residences. The 10% of the affordable units’ respondents
who had experienced some form of bias said mostly that it did not emanate from
Table 13. Level of interaction in relation to the main drivers identified through the open-ended
questions and by typology of residents in Santa Monica (Source: authors’ survey, December 2018).
Residents who interacted in common rooms/spaces Through children When walking dogs Total
Market units 50% 50% 0% 100%
Affordable units 50% 30% 20% 100%
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within their residences but from their needy colleagues who were upset that they did
not have access to the affordable units themselves.
Generally, the findings revealed that there is great support for an inclusionary pol-
icy among residents. Asked if the presence of low-income people within their build-
ings undermined the satisfaction they got from their units, all the market-rate
occupants said that it did not. Most respondents indicated that IH is a good and a
necessary tool with impressive results. Others indicated that more needs to be done
to achieve better results. However, some cautioned that IH should not be applied
everywhere in the city and zoning should be respected but mixed-use zoning should
be promoted. There was a feeling among some of them that the city leaders are too
‘soft’ on developers and need to push them harder.
Figure 10. Distribution by age of those who had interacted in Santa Monica.
Source: Survey by authors (December 2018)
Figure 11. Distribution by race of those who had interacted in Santa Monica Source: Survey by
authors (December 2018).
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The findings from the survey have been further corroborated by fieldwork and dir-
ect observation, which confirmed that buildings following the IH regulations incorp-
orate very-low income units which are not at all recognizable in visual terms. The
Figure 12. Floor plans for typical studio and two bedroomed apartments for a multi-family devel-
opment (actual building shown in Figure 13, Santa Monica City, Source: Developer’s website:
http://swaysantamonica.com/residences/floorplans, retrieved December 2018.
Figure 13. Inclusionary Housing along 6th and Broadway Avenues, Santa Monica. Source: Authors’
photo, April 2018.
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only way to identify them is through the technical floor plans (Figure 12), but in
terms of the actual built environment, they all look alike (Figure 13).
Although the program has achieved great success, interviews with planning staff
revealed that there are challenges in dealing with Tier 3 development agreements.
The communities put the staff under enormous stress during negotiations with end-
less demands and the city ended up having 40 pending negotiation agreements after
the implementation of LUCE 2010. However, most of these projects have now been
either approved, withdrawn or given development review permits. Furthermore, inter-
views with the planning officers suggest that negotiation should be used on complex
cases but should not be extended to all planning applications, to avoid overburdening
the program implementation.
7. Conclusion
This research focusses on changes brought about by the Land Use and Circulation
Element (LUCE) 2010 on the City of Santa Monica’s affordable housing production
program and has found that the tiered bonus-based changes served to enhance the
program goals of increasing the stock of affordable housing and enabling social inte-
gration. LUCE 2010 provided a very comprehensive and a well-structured approach
to using the market to provide equitable affordable housing using the principle that
allowing incremental increases in the development intensity enhances the value of the
property and hence developers have to include affordable housing in their projects. It
brought a balance of interests by requiring economic feasibility analyses of the proj-
ects so that, as the community obtains its benefits, the developers are also assured of
their project’s feasibility. The program was found to have enabled developers to
achieve feasibility and provide housing at deeper levels of affordability than there
was before.
LUCE 2010 offers a comprehensive policy on mixed use development and demon-
strates that land use policies and planning can help encourage greater supply and
affordability, as well as influencing the type and location of housing enabling house-
holds to access neighborhoods of opportunity. Even as LUCE 2010 brought success
to the AHPP, useful lessons have been learned which could be beneficial for imple-
menting IH programs in a similar context.
1. Although using negotiations and development agreements ensures optimal
affordable housing opportunities and gives certainty to developers, they should
be limited to large projects. An over-reliance on them might result in an admin-
istrative burden on the locality and on additional time taken and resources
required for the developer.
2. Engaging developers helps minimize opposition and increases the success of an
IH program. Economic ‘land value enhancement’ analyses undertaken under
LUCE 2010 provide the basis for negotiation between landowners/developers and
the city.
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3. There is a need to put a cap on the low-income and very-low income units’ per-
centages. Developers usually choose what is most feasible to them and this may
lead to a shortage of one housing category.
4. There is a need to rethink about giving developers a choice to pay fees in-lieu of
developing affordable units because this seems to work against the goals of the
program. If in-lieu fees have to be an option, there is a need to revise the fees
based on the cost of providing an affordable unit. When considering eliminating
in-lieu fees, then, from Santa Monica’s experience, it might be appropriate to
consider the size of the project, with developments above a certain size required
to build the units on site.
5. The Santa Monica case confirms that IH can be a powerful tool to achieve effect-
ive social integration. This finding was based on the data gathered through the
survey and corroborated through direct observation.
The evaluation of the LUCE program offers valuable insights to planners and pol-
icy makers internationally. Some limitations of this study should be taken into con-
sideration. The LUCE program has only been in place since 2010. Given its
overwhelming approval by the stakeholders, it will be interesting to see its impact
over a long period transcending leadership and property market cycles.
There could be limitations to the transferability given that Santa Monica is a con-
tained city in terms of its geographical size and given its favorable conditions in
terms of progressive political and local governance. However, Santa Monica’s experi-
ence is relevant and applicable to other cities because it shows how planning for
accommodating new growth can be harnessed to increase the production of afford-
able housing and foster integrated communities through IH.
We suggest that cities with less experience or capacity could benefit from shadow-
ing what has been done in such frontrunner cities by means of dedicated programs
such as staff exchanges and best practice training. Also, Santa Monica is a wealthy,
desirable community enjoying world-famous beaches meaning that there is a sus-
tained housing demand. Cities intending to use a similar model may need to evaluate
the soundness of their property market to guarantee the desired demand for the
effective implementation of such a program.
Based on the above findings and conclusions and bearing in mind the identified limi-
tations, this research offers valuable lessons on using IH for equitable affordable housing
provision applicable to the wider international context and sits within the body of know-
ledge aimed at understanding how LVC and IH can benefit the wider community.
Further studies could expand on the social inclusion and IH nexus. A possible
investigation is the spatial location of affordable IH units against affordable units pro-
duced through alternative instruments and analyzing the correlation to socio-eco-
nomic indicators and the level of accessibility to public services and facilities.
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